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Requirements Framing Affects Design Creativity
Rahul Mohanani, Burak Turhan, Member, IEEE and Paul Ralph
Abstract—Design creativity, the originality and practicality of a solution concept is critical for the success of many software projects.
However, little research has investigated the relationship between the way desiderata are presented and design creativity. This study
therefore investigates the impact of presenting desiderata as ideas, requirements or prioritized requirements on design creativity. Two
between—subjects randomized controlled experiments were conducted with 42 and 34 participants. Participants were asked to create
design concepts from a list of desiderata. Participants who received desiderata framed as requirements or prioritized requirements
created designs that are, on average, |ess original but more practical than the designs created by participants who received desiderata
framed as ideas. This suggests that more formal, structured presentations of desiderata are less appropriate where a creative solution
is desired. The results also show that design performance is highly susceptible to minor changes in the vernacular used to
communicate desiderata.
Index Terms—Cognitive bias, creativity, design, experiment, originality, practicality, requirements, prioritization.
 
1 INTRODUCTION
HE software engineering (SE) research community
widely accepts that understanding system requirements
is critical for designing good software systems [1]. The
assumptions that software projects have discoverable and
documentable requirements, and that good requirements
specifications lead to good software [2], have stimulated
diverse attempts to improve RE processes. For example,
prioritizing requirements is gaining popularity in complex
software-intensive systems [3]—[5].
One might expect a clear, well-structured, simplified and
rationalized account of what is required to increase the odds
of a good system design [6], especially in mission/safety
critical domains. However, task structure is negatively as-
sociated with design performance [7]. Specifically, ”over-
concentration (over-structuring) on problem definition does
not necessarily lead to successful design outcomes” [8,
p. 439]. In other words, labelling desiderata as requirements
may reduce design performance, especially in non—critical
application domains where creativity and innovation makes
the business difference. Yet, SE research has not empirically
investigated the effects of presenting (framing) desiderata in
different ways. Faced with explicit requirements, practition-
ers tend to fixate on early solution ideas or existing solutions
and produce less original designs [9].
This raises an interesting question. Suppose we have a
list of things that are needed or wanted for some system.
Does the way we present that list to a product designer
affect their performance? More formally:
Research Question: Does theframing of desiderata afiect
design creativity?
Here, a desideratum is a property of a real or imagined
system that is wanted, needed or preferred by one or more
project stakeholders. Framing alludes to the framing ejfect:
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”the tendency to give different responses to problems that
have surface dissimilarities but are formally identical” [10,
p. 88]. Here, it specifically refers to the way in which
desiderata are presented (e.g. a list of “the system shall...”
specifications [11], a backlog of user stories [12], a collec-
tion of use case narratives [13]). Meanwhile, creativity is a
cognitive process of generating one or more ideas (in this
case, for a software artifact) that are not only novel but
also feasible [14]. Consequently, we operationalize design
creativity in terms of both originality and practicality.
This article extends an earlier study investigating the
effect of desiderata framing on the originality of design con-
cepts [15]. This earlier study found that labelling desider-
ata as requirements led to less original designs. Several
colleagues suggested that originality is only one aspect of
design performance and that prioritizing the requirements
should improve performance. We were therefore inspired to
perform a second study with prioritized requirements, and
to evaluate practicality as well as originality of designs.
This article therefore extends our earlier work in two
ways. First, we re-analyze the data from our previous study
to measure the effect of the treatment on the practicality of
the solution concepts. Second, we conduct another exper-
iment to investigate the effects of presenting desiderata as
prioritized requirements on both originality and practicality.
This paper also includes a significantly updated discussion.
Parts of this paper, including sections 2 and 4, re-use text
from the earlier publication, where relevant.
Next, we review existing literature on fixation, the fram-
ing effect and creativity (Section 2). Then, we describe
the research method (Section 3), followed by the analysis
and results (Section 4). Section 5 interprets the results and
summarizes the study’s implications. Section 6 discusses
the threats to validity. Section 7 concludes the paper with
a summary of its contributions.
2 RELATED WORK
This section provides an overview of the major concepts that
contribute to the theory behind the two experiments.
2.1 Fixation and the Framing Effect
Cognitive biases are systematic deviations from optimal rea-
soning [16]. They help to explain many common problems
in diverse SE activities including design (e.g. [17]), testing
(e.g. [18]), requirements engineering (e.g. [19]), project man-
agement (e.g. [20]) and in SE generally (e.g. [21]). Research
on cognitive biases is useful not only to identify common
errors, their causes and how to avoid them in SE processes,
but also for developing better practices [22], methods [23],
and artifacts [24]. The current study is primarily concerned
with two cognitive biases—fixation and the framing efiect.
The way decision options are presented biases decision
making [25]. Specifically, the framing ejfect is ”the tendency
to give different responses to problems that have surface
dissimilarities but that are really formally identical” [10,
p. 88]. For example, in one experiment, participants were
asked to choose between two treatments for a hypothet-
ical disease—treatrnent A would save 200 of 600 people,
whereas, treatment B had 1 in 3 chance of saving everyone
and 2 in 3 chance of saving no one. Participants were
asked to choose between 400 people definitely dying or a
1 in 3 chance that no one will die. Although the expected
effectiveness of the two treatments are exactly the same,
most of the participants chose the latter. However, when
participants were asked to choose between definitely saving
200 people or a 1 in 3 chance of saving everyone, most
chose the former [26]. Here, the difference in response is
determined by the way the question is framed rather than
the facts. The framing effect is extremely robust [27], affects
many individuals across diverse circumstances, and has not
been studied much in SE.
Fixation, originally proposed by Freud regarding human
sexuality, gradually broadened to refer to a tendency to
”disproportionately focus on one aspect of an event, object
or situation, especially self—imposed or imaginary obstacles”
[28, p. 5]. Fixation is one of many biases related to selective
attention—the tendency for different people to perceive
the same events differently [29]. Several experiments have
demonstrated design fixation—the tendency for designers to
generate solutions very similar to given examples [30], [31]
or existing artifacts [32]. In other words, fixation prevents
software designers from making original or novel associa-
tions, or envisioning alternative solutions [33].
Providing design examples causes design fixation, but
the effects of design fixation are moderated by several
factors; for example: (1) the propensity for fixation varies
by domain; for instance, mechanical engineers fixate more
than industrial designers [34] ; (2) common examples induce
greater fixation than unusual examples [35]; (3) priming
designers with good examples leads to better design per-
formance than priming designers with intentionally flawed
examples or no examples [36] ; (4) Fixation is partially deter-
mined by the way the task is framed [33]. Fig. 1 summarizes
these effects.
This last point highlights the relationship between fixa-
tion and framing. Earlier work (e.g. [37], [38]) has investi-
gated fixation by giving participants different instructions,
where the independent variable was task framing and the
resulting fixation were conceptualized as a kind of framing
effect. Of course, individuals can become fixated without
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Fig. 1. Model of Design Fixation
Note: Filled arrows indicate moderating efi'ect; unfilled arrows indicate causa—
tion.
any experimental framing intervention. However, many
studies on fixation leverage framing effects (e.g. [39], [40]).
Consequently, instead of designersfixate am given examples we
can think of these studies as showing that taskframing causes
fixation. (Below, we also use framing to induce fixation.)
2.2 Creativity
No single definition of creativity is universally accepted;
however, for our purposes creativity refers to ”production
of novel and useful ideas by an individual or small group
of individuals working together" [41, p. 127]. Creativity is
often linked with divergent thinking [42]—exploring many
diverse solutions to a problem.
Creativity is a multi-dimensional construct [41]; a cre-
ative artifact is not only novel [43], [44] but also practically
useful [14], [45]—[47]. This dual criteria View of creativity
is widely accepted in engineering design (e.g. [48]) and
specifically software engineering (e.g. [49]). However, these
criteria are not equal—when assessing creativity, we con-
sider usefulness only if the solution is novel [50].
The dual criteria View suggests assessing creativity by
evaluating an artifact’s originality and practicality [51], [52].
However, since no objective metrics for originality or prac-
ticality exist, studies typically use expert judges to assess
creativity [53], [54], [55]. (Below, we also use expert judges
to assess creativity.)
SE research predominantly considers creativity in the
context of requirements engineering [56], software design
[57], agile development [58] and open source software [59].
The relationship between creativity and RE is highly
controversial. Many scholarly articles, textbooks and official
standards present requirements engineering as discovering
requirements in an objective reality and inferring system
properties from these objective requirements (cf. [60]). In
contrast, many scholars have proposed applying creativity
techniques to requirements engineering, including creativ-
ity workshops, brainstorming, mind-rnapping, the 5W1H
method (i.e. asking when, where, who, what, why and how
to gather new ideas), and various interactive collaboration
techniques [57], [61], [62]. Some scholars consider RE as
an intrinsically creative process [61], [63] where software
requirements encapsulate the results of creative thinking
about the system [49].
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Fig. 2. Theoretical model for requirements fixation
Note: Unfilled arrows indicate causation; unfilled diamond indicates aggrega—
tion; plus and minus signs indicate magnitude of effect.
3 RESEARCH METHOD
The section describes two between—subjects, randomized
controlled experiments, Experiment One and Experiment
Two, that investigate the relationship between desiderata
framing and design creativity (see Table 1 for an overview).
In both experiments, participants with some software design
experience were randomly assigned to a treatment group
or control group. All participants were given the same
set of desiderata and asked to design, on paper, a mobile
application. The designs were then shuffled and assessed
by two experts.
Experiment One compares desiderata framed as require-
ments (treatment) to desiderata framed as ideas (control);
Experiment Two compares prioritized requirements (treat-
ment) to ideas (control). We chose ideas framing against
requirements because an idea could be either good or bad,
promotes skepticism and generally does not connote any
sort of preference. Moreover, we conceptualized ideas fram-
ing as a simple yet tractable alternative to minimize the
difference between the two groups and to isolate the psy-
chological effects of framing desiderata as requirements. We
continued to use ideas framing in the second experiment to
maintain maximum control over cross-study synthesis and
to maximize the validity of the results by combining the two
experiments (see Section 4.3).
3.1
More abstract, uncertain, incomplete problem framing leads
to solutions that are more original than more specific, struc-
tured problem framing does, for at least three reasons:
Hypotheses
1) More structure encourages fixation on early solution
ideas [64], established solutions [30], [34] and bogus
requirements [15].
2) Non—specific or open goals lead to more learning
[65] by reducing cognitive load [66] and increasing
unconscious assimilation of problem relevant infor-
mation [67].
3) Presenting conflicting objectives leads to more cre-
ative solutions [68].
In other words, presenting a task with more ambiguity
and uncertainty leads to more exploration, learning, and
departing from norms (i.e. divergent thinking). This leads to
designs that are more original but sometimes less practical.
Presenting desiderata as ideas is more ambiguous and
uncertain than presenting desiderata as requirements. Here,
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the designer may wonder, what are these ideas? and how
should they be used? Prioritizing the requirements adds fur-
ther structure and clarity. We therefore hypothesize that
participants who received more structured desiderata fram-
ing will produce designs that are less original and more
practical (see Fig. 2); more formally:
H1: Participants who receive desiderata framed as require—
ments will produce design concepts that are less original
than the design concepts produced by participants who
received desiderata framed as ideas.
H2: Participants who receive desiderata framed as require—
ments will produce design concepts that are more practical
than the design concepts produced by participants who
received desiderata framed as ideas.
H3: Participants who receive desiderata framed as pri—
oritized requirements will produce design concepts that
are less original than the design concepts produced by
participants who received desiderata framed as ideas.
H4: Participants who receive desiderata framed as pri—
oritized requirements will produce design concepts that
are more practical than the design concepts produced by
participants who received desiderata framed as ideas.
In other words, Experiment One tests whether desider-
ata framed as requirements leads to designs that are more
practical but less original than desiderata framed as ideas.
Experiment Two tests whether desiderata framed as priori-
tized requirements leads to designs that are more practical
but less original than desiderata framed as ideas.
3.2 Materials and procedure
We compiled a list of 25 desiderata for a health and fitness
mobile application based on existing applications in this
genre. The idea was to create a manageable list of desiderata
that participants might be familiar (but not well-versed)
with. As our intended participants were not trained RE
professionals or expert designers (see Section 3.4), we aimed
for a realistic, yet imperfect specification document that
might be created by a client without formal RE training,
rather than the polished work of an expert requirements
analyst [69]. Since we could not find a similar available list,
we compiled the desiderata based on features of existing
health-fitness apps for Experiment One. We decided to use
the exact same list, albeit prioritized, for Experiment Two to
make cross-study comparisons more valid (as explained in
Section 3) and to maintain a consistent series of experiments
[70].
We created three versions of the list. Each version con-
tained the same desiderata (e.g. ”measure calorie intake”)
in the same order. The only differences were: in the first
version, the desiderata were called ideas and phrased ”The
system might measure calorie intake”; in the second ver-
sion, the desiderata were called requirements and phrased
”The system shall measure calorie intake”; and in the third
version, the desiderata were organized into five priority
levels. The priority levels were determined by asking seven
experienced colleagues from the first author’s university to
prioritize the desiderata by importance. We used a weighted
average to combine their judgments.
TABLE 1
Overview of experimental design
 
Design element Experiment One Experiment Two
Location United Kingdom Finland
Number of participants 42 34
Mean age of participants (years) 25 26
Treatment group Desiderata framed as requirements Desiderata framed as prioritized requirements
Control group
Dependent variables
Dependent variable scale
Instrumentation
Main statistical test
Desiderata framed as ideas
Design originality and practicality
Ordinal
Expert judgment
Mann Whitney U test (non-parametric)
Each experiment was conducted in two parallel ses-
sions, in separate rooms with very similar dimensions and
settings. Participants were randomly assigned to one of
the two rooms on arrival by the invigilators. Participants
signed a consent form and then filled in a pre-task (de-
mographic) questionnaire. Next, the invigilators distributed
the task documents: the list of desiderata and identical de-
sign templates comprising several blank mobile screen—sized
boxes in portrait and landscape orientations, with space
for written explanations. In both experiments, the control
group received the ideas document. In Experiment One, the
treatment group received the requirements document; in Ex-
periment Two, the treatment group received the prioritized
requirements document. Participants were given 60 minutes
to complete the design task, after which they filled our
a post-task questionnaire including a manipulation check
(described below). All of the task documents are available
in our replication package 1.
3.3 Data collection and assessment procedure
The designs were de-identified, combined into a single set,
randomly ordered and given to two independent, expert
judges. The first author and a colleague who is a senior
researcher in software design and creativity evaluated the
design concepts for Experiment One. For Experiment Two,
a highly recognized expert (professor) in digital design for
public health-care sector in the first author’s university
and a software professional with 8 years of experience
in software design and development for large scale ERP
systems were the two judges. As in similar studies (e.g. [71]—
[73]), the judges evaluated the designs using the Consensual
Assessment Technique [74]. That is, the judges scored each
design for originality and practicality on a five-point scale
from low (1) to high (5). Here originality means being new
and not found or implemented in similar applications, while
practicality means being straightforward and appropriate for
an actual use in a specific context, rather than a hypothetical
use.
For each experiment, the judges discussed the meaning
of originality and practicality, then graded three randomly
selected designs together to establish a common under-
standing of the grading procedure. The judges then eval-
uated the remaining designs independently. Disagreements
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Fig. 3. Example of a highly original design
were resolved by a third expert judge. The data analysis
script and final grades are also available in our replication
package 1. Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 are examples of a highly
original and a highly practical design respectively Both, Fig.
3 and Fig. 4, represents the ’log-in screen’ for the mobile
application.
3.4 Participants
For Experiment One, participation was solicited from man-
agement and engineering postgraduate students enrolled at
Lancaster University, United Kingdom using the relevant
student mailing lists. A convenience sample of 19 females
and 23 males with a mean age of 25 years (standard
deviation 6.07) participated. Fourteen participants had a
software engineering background. Participants received a
complimentary lunch coupon for participating in the study.
For Experiment Two, participants were recruited from
postgraduate students enrolled in the information process-
ing science program at the University of Oulu, Finland.
A convenience sample of 34 participants were selected,
comprising of seven female and 27 male subjects with an
average age of 26 years (standard deviation 5.83). Partici-
pants received extra credit as a part of their coursework.
All of the participants had at least one year of experience
in software development. No participants had experience
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Fig. 4. Example of a highly practical design
in the specific task domain of health and fitness mobile
applications.
4 ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
This section summarizes the results of the two experiments,
followed by a cross-study synthesis, which combines the
data from both the experiments.
4.1 Experiment One
4.1.1 Reliability
Participants produced 42 designs. The judges agreed on the
originality of 34 and the practicality of 36 designs. This gives
inter-rater agreement (Cohen’s kappa) of 0.67 for originality
and 0.78 for practicality grades, which indicates ’substantial
agreement’, and hence acceptable reliability [75].
4.1.2 Hypothesis testing
To test Hypotheses H1 and H2, we compared the dis-
tributions of originality (Table 2; Fig. 5) and practicality
(Table 3; Fig. 6) grades across the two groups. Both, orig-
inality (p=0.08) and practicality (p=0.153) grades meet the
assumption for homogeneity of variance (Levene’s non-
parametric test [76]). However, neither originality nor prac-
ticality grades are normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk test
[77] p=0.003 for both). The data therefore meets the four
assumptions of the Mann—Whitney U test:
0 The dependent variable is ordinal or continuous.
o The independent variable has two categorically inde-
pendent groups.
0 Independence of observations (e.g. a between-
subjects design).
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o The dependent variable exhibits homogeneity of
variance.
Hypothesis H1: Participants who received the ideas fram-
ing produced designs that are significantly more original
(U=116.5; n=42; p=0.004). The effect size (Cliff’s 6: -0.49)2
indicates a ’high-effect’ with 95% CI [-0.74, -0.13] [79].
Hypothesis H2: In contrast, participants who received
desiderata framed as requirements produced designs that are
significantly more practical (U=128.5; n=42; p=0.018). The
effect size (Cliff’s 620.41) indicates a ’rnediurn-high’ effect
with 95% CI [0.06, 0.67] [79].
4. 1.3 Exploratory analysis
In Section 3.1, we theorized that framing desiderata as
requirements would increase designers’ propensity for fix-
ation. While thoroughly investigating the cognitive mecha-
nisms underlying fixation would require a more exploratory
kind of study (e.g. a think-aloud protocol study [80]), the
post-task questionnaire included a simple manipulation
check. The participants were asked to rate, on a five-point
scale, the importance of the list of desiderata (as require-
ments or ideas) for guiding their designs. If the manipula-
tion was successful:
0 the treatment group (requirements framing) should
rate the desiderata as more important than the con-
trol group (ideas framing);
o desiderata importance should be directly related to
practicality;
o desiderata importance should be inversely related to
originality.
The treatment group (median=4) rated the desiderata
as more important than the control group (median=3). The
statistical significance of this difference is difficult to assess
because the data exhibits neither normality, as assumed by
the independent samples t-test; nor homogeneity of vari-
ance, as assumed by the Mann—Whitney U test. However,
both tests suggest that the difference is statistically signifi-
cant (n=42; U=125.5 p=0.011; t=2.97, p=0.006). The effect size
(Cliff’s 620.43) indicates a ’rnediurn-high’ effect with a 95%
CI [0.09, 0.68].
Meanwhile, desiderata importance is directly related to
practicality (Spearman correlation, rho=0.193) and inversely
related to originality (rho=-0.205) but neither difference is
statistically significant (p=0.111, p=0.096 respectively) 3.
4.2 Experiment Two
4.2.1 Reliability
The participants produced 32 total designs. The judges
agreed on 26 originality scores (Cohen’s kappa=0.7) and
23 practicality scores (Cohen’s kappa=0.65). This indicates
’substantial agreement’ [75] and therefore acceptable relia-bility.
2. Cliff’s Delta (6) for the Mann-Whitney U test is calculated by using
the equation: #(X1 > X2) — #(X1 < X2)/n1n2, where X1 and X2
are scores within the groups (i.e. Group A and Group B) and ml and 712
are the sizes of the sample groups. The cardinality symbol # indicates
counting [78].
3. All of the correlations reported in this paper are one-tailed because
we have an a priori theoretical reason to expect: (1) direct correlations
between problem structure and practicality; and (2) inverse correlations
between problem structure and originality.
TABLE 2
Frequency of originality grades (Experiment One)
 
Grade Treatment (Requirements) Control (Ideas)
1 1 2
2 7 1
3 12 6
4 0 10
5 1 2
Mean 2.67 3.43
Median 3 4
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Fig. 5. Originality grades across both the groups (Experiment One)
4.2.2 Hypothesis testing
To test hypotheses H3 and H4, we compared the distribu-
tions of originality (Table 5; Fig. 7) and practicality (Table 6;
Fig. 8) scores across the two groups. As in Experiment One,
the dependent variables exhibit homogeneity of variance—
originality (Levene’s test p=0.319); practicality (p=0.138)—
but not normality—originality (Shapiro-Wilk test p=0.02);
practicality (p<0.001). We therefore again employ the Mann-
Whitney U test.
Hypothesis H3: Participants who received the ideas fram-
ing produced designs that are significantly more original
(Mann—Whitney U test; U284, n=34, p=0.02). The effect size
(Cliff’s 62 -0.43); 95% CI [-0.71, 005] indicates a ’medium-
high’ effect.
Hypothesis H4: In contrast, participants who received
desiderata framed as prioritized requirements produced de-
signs that are significantly more practical (Mann-Whitney U
test; U277, n=34, p=0.02). The effect size (Cliff’s 620.46); 95%
CI [0.07, 0.73] indicates a ’rnediurn-high’ effect.
4.2.3 Exploratory analysis
As in Experiment One, we included the desiderata-
irnportance manipulation check in the post-study ques-
tionnaire. Again, participants in the treatment group (pri-
oritized requirements) indicated that the desiderata were
more important than participants in the control group, with
medians of 4 and 2 respectively (Table 7). Again, the data
is non-normal with unequal variance, but both the Mann-
TABLE 3
Frequency of practicality grades (Experiment One)
 
Grade Treatment (Requirements) Control (Ideas)
1 2 5
2 2 6
3 6 5
4 6 4
5 5 1
Mean 3.48 2.52
Median 4 2
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Fig. 6. Practicality grades across both the groups (Experiment One)
Whitney U test and independent samples t-test suggest that
the difference is statistically significant for importance of
desiderata (n=34; U=36.5, p<0.001; t=4.92, p<0.001) with a
’high' effect size (Cliff's 620.74; 95% CI [0.38, 0.91]).
Again, desiderata importance is directly related to prac-
ticality (Spearman correlation, rho:0.374; p=0.015) and in-
versely related to originality (rh02-0.195; p20.135) but this
time the relationship between perceived desiderata impor-
tance and the practicality of the resulting design concepts is
statistically significant.
Participants were also asked, ”How confident are you
that the conceptual design(s) you created can be implemented
as a mobile app?” with a five-point scale from ’not sure’ to
’extremely sure’ (Table 8). The treatment group—in our case,
prioritized requirements group, indicated greater confidence
in the practicality of their designs than the control group
TABLE 4
Frequency of ’importance of desiderata’ scores (Experiment One)
 
Importance Treatment (Requirements) Control (Ideas)
1 (least) 0 3
2 1 5
3 2 3
4 12 6
5 (most) 6 4
Mean 4.10 3.14
Median 4 3
TABLE 5
Frequency of originality grades (Experiment Two)
 
 
Grade Treatment (Prioritized req.) Control (Ideas)
1 6 2
2 6 5
3 3 2
4 2 6
5 0 2
Mean 2.06 3.06
Median 2 3
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Fig. 7. Originality grades across both the groups (Experiment Two)
(U277.5, n=34, p=0.017; t22.60, p=0.014) with a ’medium-
high’ effect size (Cliff’s 620.46; 95% CI [0.07, 0.73]). Partici-
pants responses were positively correlated with the judges’
practicality scores, but the correlation was not quite signifi-
cant (rho=0.284; p=0.052).
4.3 Cross-study synthesis
To conduct a meta-analysis, we combined the data from both
experiments into three groups—the control group (ideas;
n238), treatment one (requirements; n=21), and treatment
two (prioritized requirements; n217)—producing a clear
pattern (Table 9). More structure leads to less original-
ity (rho=0.430, p<0.001). Both treatment groups exhibit
better practicality than the control group (Kruskal-Wallis
H211.978, p=0.003) 4.
Prioritizing the requirements counter-intuitively appears
to reduce practicality, but this result should be interpreted
with caution because it involves comparing unequal groups
from two different studies.
Does fixation mediate the relationship between problem
structure and creativity? Mediation requires four conditions:
4. Again, the data exhibits equal variances (Levene’s non-parametric
test, p=0.06 for originality; p20.25 for practicality) grades but is not
normally distributed (Shapiro-Wilk test for normality confirmed non-
normal distributions for both originality (p<0.001) and practicality
(p<0.001) grades.
TABLE 6
Frequency of practicality grades (Experiment Two)
 
 
Grade Treatment (Prioritized req.) Control (Ideas)
1 4 8
2 2 3
3 2 5
4 6 1
5 3 0
Mean 3.12 1.94
Median 4 2
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Fig. 8. Practicality grades across both the groups (Experiment Two)
1) The independent variable is correlated with the de-
pendent variables. (Supported: rh02-0.430, p<0.001
for originality; rho:0.338, p=0.001 for practicality.)
2) The independent variable is correlated with the me-
diating variable. (Supported: rho:0.461, p<0.001.)
TABLE 7
Frequency of ‘importance of desiderata’ scores (Experiment Two)
 
 
Importance Treatment (Prioritized req.) Control (Ideas)
1 (least) 0 5
2 1 5
3 2 5
4 11 1
5 (most) 3 1
Mean 3.94 2.29
Median 4 2
TABLE 8
Frequency of ‘confidence of implementation’ scores (Experiment Two)
Confidence Control (Ideas)
1 (not sure)
2
3
4
5 (extremely sure)
Mean 4.
Median
Treatment (Pri. req.)
H>
Q0
\\
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TABLE 9
Cross—study synthesis
 
Control Treatment 1 Treatment 2
(Ideas) (Requirements) (Prior. req.)
mean originality 3.26 2.67 2.06
mean practicality 2.26 3.48 3.12
n 38 21 17
3) The mediating variable is correlated with the
dependent variables. (Partially supported; impor-
tance of desiderata is positively correlated with
practicality—rh020.297, p20.005—and negatively
correlated with originality—rho:-0.144, p20.108);
however, the latter is not statistically significant).
4) Controlling for the mediating variable reduces the
absolute value of the correlation between the inde-
pendent and dependent variables. (For practicality
rho drops from 0.338 to 0.201; for originality, from
-0.430 to -0.400.)
This suggests that fixation mediates the effect of problem
structure on practicality. It could mean that fixation does
not mediate the effect of problem structure on originality,
or it could mean that this effect is not very strong and our
sample was not large enough to detect it. In either case, this
is not what we expected. Our understanding of the literature
suggests that fixation mediates the relationship between
problem structure and originality, not practicality. We have
no theoretical justification for benefiting practicality.
5 DISCUSSION
The needs, desires, preferences, and conjectures of project
stakeholders can be framed in many ways—as require-
ments, user stories, scenarios, use cases, or simply as ideas.
Prior research suggests that more structured, unambiguous
task framing leads to designs that are less original but more
practical (see Section 2). However, no previous studies have
established whether this phenomenon applies to software
engineering.
The purpose of the two experiments reported above is
therefore to investigate whether a small change in the way
desiderata are framed can induce a significant difference in
design outcomes. Each experiment indicates that presenting
the same collection of desiderata in slightly different ways
has a profound effect on design performance. Presenting
desiderata as requirements leads to significantly designs
that are more practical but less original.
The meaning of this finding is clear. When a project
calls for innovation—significant departures from current
approaches—desiderata should not be presented as require-
ments. In contrast, when a project calls for more straight-
forward, archetypal solutions, presenting desiderata as re-
quirements is more appropriate. Being randomized con-
trolled trials, these findings are very robust, and have well-
understood limitations (see Section 6).
These findings conflict with the dominant View in re-
quirements engineering (RE), namely, that providing more
clarity, precision and structure is critical for success. Some
RE experts rnay struggle to accept that more ambiguity is
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sometimes better. We think this is rooted in the different
worldviews of requirements analysts (or at least, the re-
quirements engineering academic literature) and designers
(or at least, the interdisciplinary literature on design).
In RE, a requirement is something that is demanded, be-
cause success means delivering whatever was agreed. If the
client wants the funeral home’s website all in Comic Sans
font, then that is a requirement. In user-centered design,
a requirement is something that is needed, because success
means that the stakeholders benefit from the system. The
funeral home’s website will be in an appropriately sober,
presumably not Comic Sans font, because it is better for both
the users and the business. Moreover, one may further argue
for a distinction between mandatory and optional require-
ments. However, the psychological effects of mislabeling
ostensible features of a system as requirements suggests that
using any additional labels will likely increase confusion
and curtail creativity [81].
In RE, it is often assumed that users have requirements—
the trick is eliciting thern. Empirical research does not sup-
port this view. People generally do not answer questions
by retrieving relevant enduring preferences from an inter-
nal directory. Rather, during an interview, the analyst and
the user co-construct evanescent preferences [82]. Although
many RE researchers have suggested that requirements are
invented from a set of conflicting opinions, beliefs, wishes or
preferences (e.g. [63], [83]), yet much RE research still con-
tinues to assume that requirements are elicited. Labeling a
fleeting preference as a requirement inflates both its estimated
importance and our confidence in that estimate. Given such
requirements to a designer, paints an inaccurate picture of
the project context.
This brings us to the results of our exploratory analysis.
While this analysis has more threats to validity (see Section
6), it does suggest a strong negative relationship between
problem-structuring and design originality. The obvious
question is, why? Why would designers produce design concepts
that are less original and more practical in response to more
formal desiderata framing? Although the main goal of our
experiments was not to answer this question, we can make
some educated guesses.
Previous research on design fixation investigated how
providing designers with explicit examples reduces their
creativity [32], [33]. We extend this idea by showing that
framing desiderata as requirements similarly diminishes
originality, even without examples. This is also similar to
mental—set fixation—a situation where practitioners restrict
the use of their own abilities due to situationally induced
bias [30]. Meanwhile, some designers are biased against
originality a priori (cf. [84], [85]) and expert designers tend
to treat given desiderata and constraints more skeptically
regardless of framing [86].
In other words, we suspect that the high importance and
confidence connoted by the term requirement, coupled with
a predetermined order of implementation (i.e. prioritized
requirements), shuts down participants’ creative potential
by promoting the View that the problem is already well-
understood and largely solved. The requirements framing
induces participants to fixate on the stated desiderata in-
stead of exploring the solution space.
This led us to theorize that software professionals are
prone to requirements fixation—the tendency to rely heavily
on desiderata that are explicitly framed as requirements.
Some of the symptoms of requirements fixation may in-
clude:
o Failing to question doubtful, ambiguous or conflict-
ing desiderata.
o Perceiving desiderata as having equal (high) impor-
tance.
o Perceiving desiderata as having equal confidence.
0 Failing to consider the difference between project
goals and desiderata.
o Failing to consider implicit or non—functional
desiderata.
Our exploratory analysis only partially supports require-
ments fixation. Fixation mediated the relationship between
framing and practicality, but not originality—all the cor-
relations are in the expected directions but the correlation
between fixation and originality is small (by Cohen’s stan-
dard) and not statistically significant. More research on this
is clearly needed (see below).
5.1 Implications for SE research
While RE research traditionally focuses more on the quality
of requirements specifications, the presentation of desider-
ata also appears important. Presentation issues include not
only modeling techniques (e.g. use cases, scenarios, goal
models, agent models, IEEE-830 style ”the system shall...”
statements) but also, as demonstrated here, the language
used to convey them. A series of randomized controlled tri-
als and replication studies similar to this study with expert
and novice designers as participants are needed to inves-
tigate how desiderata framing affects design performance.
Qualitative and protocol studies are needed to uncover the
cognitive mechanisms underlying these framing effects.
RE research traditionally focuses on prioritizing desider-
ata and distinguishing mandatory desiderata (i.e. needs)
from optional desiderata (i.e. wants). RE may benefit from
techniques for indicating the epistemic status of a desidera-
turn, e.g. 80% certainty that the system will need to support
encryption; and techniques or tools for representing, analyz-
ing and addressing ill-structured design tasks. We recom-
rnend presenting less certain and less important desiderata
in a manner that promotes skepticism and is appropriate
to the particular context. However, this raises numerous
questions for future research including how combining
confidence and importance metadata affect creativity and
practicality. Moreover, we wonder about the mixed signals
of giving a desideraturn low confidence or low importance
and still labeling it a requirement.
5.2 Implications for SE practice
Our results suggest that presenting desiderata as mandatory
curtails creativity, independent of the desiderata themselves.
If more original solutions are preferred, desiderata should
be framed less formally; maybe even to induce skepticism.
However, modeling desiderata more formally might result
in solutions that are more practical.
While we used a list-of-ideas framing in both the exper-
iments, we do not advocate simply renaming requirements
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to ideas. The ideas framing is neither supposed to be a
realistic approach, nor represent a specific technique in RE.
Rather, we encourage professionals to consider which way
of representing desiderata—user stories, personas, scenar-
ios, use cases, etc.—is most appropriate for the project at
hand. The aim of this study is not to get designers ignore
the real requirements, but to encourage them to critically
evaluate and recognize real requirements from the dubious
ones to produce more creative solutions.
Furthermore, professionals might consider two prop-
erties of each desideraturn—irnportance [87] and confi-
dence [88], [89]. While, importance refers to how crucial a
desideraturn is for success, confidence refers to the certainty
of the desideraturns relevance. Labeling low-irnportance,
low-confidence desiderata as requirements is likely more
problematic than labeling high—irnportance, high—confidence
desiderata as requirements. Here, however, confidence
refers to the amount of evidence supporting a desideraturn,
not how adamantly an individual insists on it.
Perhaps, to promote creativity and innovation, the term
requirement should be reserved for desiderata that have high
importance and ample supporting evidence.
5.3
Software engineering education continues to advocate over-
simplified views of RE and design. The notion that analysts
elicit requirements and designers translate those require-
ments into a system design is simply misleading. SE edu-
cation should encourage a better understanding of the psy-
chological underpinning of requirements analysis, where an
analyst understands requirements as being invented or co-
constructed along with stakeholders, and not discovered
or elicited in an objective reality as implied by the ratio-
nalist philosophy. Moreover, RE vernacular obscures the
disagreements and ambiguity in software projects, leading
to inaccurate models of desiderata. The results of this study
suggest several potential improvements to SE education:
Implications for SE education
1) More training in creativity enhancing techniques
and approaches.
2) More ambiguous projects and ill-structured prob-
lems; fewer formal specifications.
3) More exposure to theories and techniques appropri-
ate for ambiguous contexts with conflicting stake-
holders, such as actor—network theory [90] and soft
systems methodology [91].
6 THREATS TO VALIDITY
The two experiments reported here have several limita-
tions. Regarding external validity, participants were not
randomly selected from a population; therefore, statistical
generalization of results is not possible. Since we targeted
experienced but non—expert professionals, the results may
not generalize to experts or raw novices. Moreover, because
we intentionally compiled a somewhat disorganized list of
desiderata, our results may not generalize to highly refined
specifications. Since both the experiments reported in this
paper concerned a specific type of system (i.e. user-interface
of a mobile app), our results may not generalize to other
high—cornpliance or mission—critical systems that are bound
by additional constraints such as government policies, le-
gal policies, technical limitations or fixed-contracts, where
creativity is achieved by leveraging such mandatory re-
quirements (e.g. aeronautical software). Future replications
should involve designing such constrained systems. Addi-
tionally, the artificial laboratory setting of the study may
have some unknown effects.
Regarding construct validity, originality and practicality
are constructs with no objective scales, so we have to mea-
sure them using expert judgment. Different judges might
produce different results. However, we mitigated this threat
by establishing common assessment guidelines, piloting the
assessment procedure and asking a third expert judge to
resolve disagreements. High inter-rater agreement suggests
that, while subjective, the measurement strategy is reliable.
That said, originality and practicality are not the only di-
mensions of design performance, and better designs do
not automatically lead to better implementations. Moreover,
we only evaluated the creativity of the solution designs
(i.e. product) but did not assess the creativity potential of
the participants. This could be done by using a simplified
version of Torrance Test of Creative Thinking [92]. However,
research shows that such assessment tests fail to capture all
aspects of an individual’s creative potential [93].
The controlled nature of the study suggests high internal
validity. Similarly, the description of experimental protocol
above and our replication package contribute to strong
reproducibility. Meanwhile, we used well—understood statis-
tical tests on data the meets their assumptions, contributing
to high conclusion validity.
In contrast, our exploratory findings must be interpreted
with much more caution. Our manipulation check was
implemented as a non-validated, single-item scale, which
may not accurately reflect fixation. Because some of the
data was non-normal with unequal variances, we had to
use multiple, imperfectly suited tests, and therefore did
not correct for multiple comparisons. Moreover, combin-
ing results across the two studies introduces an unequal
groups threat to validity that can only be mitigated with
further experiments. In hindsight, we would have ideally
preferred one experiment with one control group and two
treatment groups. However, we were not confident that
the statistical power of such an experiment would be high
enough based on the number of available participants, so we
broke the study into two separate experiments. Any future
replications should consider combining the three groups in
a single experiment. Finally, we did not plan these analyses
in advance, which invites hypothesizing-after-results-are-
known (HARKing). We therefore present these findings as
’exploratory’ to emphasize their different epistemic status
from our main findings. Despite these limitations, however,
we felt that the exploratory findings were sufficiently inter-
esting and relevant to warrant inclusion.
7 CONCLUSION
The purpose of this research was to investigate the
question—Does the framing of desiderata afiect design creatio—
ity? We conducted two controlled experiments and found
that framing desiderata as requirements or prioritized re-
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quirements significantly affects design creativity. The major
contributions of this paper are two-fold:
1) Presenting desiderata as requirements results in de-
signs that are less original but more practical.
2) Designers are highly susceptible to minor changes
in the vernacular used to communicate desiderata.
Contributing to previous research on fixation, we pro-
pose the concept of requirements fixation—the tendency to
rely heavily on desiderata framed as requirements. While
previous research in design demonstrated that designers
fixate on the features of given examples, our results suggest
that designers may also fixate on given desiderata. Minor
changes in the vernacular used to communicate the desider-
ata can manipulate the designers’ cognitive functioning,
leading to significantly different outcomes. Moreover, the
findings emphasize the need for designers to not rely heav-
ily on requirements, and critically evaluate the desiderata
presented as requirements to produce more creative solu-
tions. Requirements fixation may be mitigated by presenting
desiderata more ambiguously, informally and uncertainly.
Future work may investigate requirements fixation more
directly, not only by observing professionals in the field but
also by developing instruments to measure fixation in the
lab. Desiderata can be presented in many formats, and more
direct empirical comparisons of these formats are needed.
To conclude, this paper highlights the innate tension
between creativity and software requirements. It reveals
that the way a specification is presented might be just as
important as its contents.
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